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Abstract
This paper studies the response times of experimental subjects play-
ing the Ultimatum game in a laboratory setting using monetary incen-
tives. We find that proposals are not significantly correlated with re-
sponse time, whereas responders’ behavior is positively and significantly
correlated. Hence, consistent with Rubisntein (forthcoming) we find that
response times may capture relevant cognitive processes. However, the
use of monetary incentives causes a reversal of his findings. These results
have implications for the information about cognitive mechanisms that
can be obtained from response times.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores response time (RT hereafter) of subjects in the UG. The
study of RT is motivated by two important issues in experimental economics.
On the one hand, the methodological issue of whether to use monetary incentives
when conducting experiments. On the other, our understanding about cognitive
processes in economic decisions.
From the very beginning, the main discrepancy between Experimental Psy-
chology and Experimental Economics has been the use of monetary incentives.
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Psychologists do not regard this issue as essential, whereas for economists, “cog-
nitive effort is a scarce resource that people have to allocate strategically” (Her-
twing & Ortmann 2001: 391). When subjects do not receive any reward they
are not sufficiently motivated to do any (cognitive) effort. Although Roth (2001)
claims that most of the economic experiments are done with monetary incen-
tives, other experiments, like the Kahneman et al. (1990) with “mugs”, have
provided other salient cases of strong incentives. Despite these differences, Eco-
nomics and Psychology are becoming closer (Camerer 2003).
With respect to cognitive processes, the emerging field of Neuroeconomics is
currently offering new insights on how people make economic decisions. Recent
developments in Neuroscience (mainly neuroimaging techniques) have provided
evidence of brain activity when subjects face games (see V. Smith 2001). For
instance, Sanfey et al. (2003) point out that responders in the Ultimatum game
face a conflict between cognitive (accept the offer) and emotional (reject it)
motives.1 However, Knoch and Fehr (2007) stress that the role played by the
main brain areas noted by Sanfey et al. (2003) is much more complex and needs
further attention. Moreover, Rubinstein (forthcoming) considers that the use of
these new techniques “are expensive and speculative type of research” (Rubin-
stein: 3). In contrast, he proposes the study of RT as a way of understanding
cognitive processes in economics.
Rubinstein’s recent paper explores differences between instinctive and cog-
nitive reasoning in terms of RT. He use a huge amount of information recorded
from subjects who played a number of games through Internet, without mon-
etary rewards. His study shows how subjects decide upon strategies and the
time they take in making their decision. His “natural world” experiment pro-
vides very valuable information with a number of examples where the theoretical
prediction is not the most fast (instinctive) response.
This paper attempts to address whether what we learn about cognitive pro-
cesses differs when monetary payoffs are used. In this sense, we pay attention
to both debates: monetary incentives and cognitive processes. We explore the
effect of monetary incentives on response time.
To do so, we use (in lab conditions) the most well known setting in Exper-
imental Economics: the Ultimatum Game (Güth et al. 1982). Our data show
that:
• Proposals are not significantly correlated with RT.
• Responders’ behavior is positively and significantly correlated with RT,
i.e., responders who took more time were more likely to state a higher
minimum acceptable offer.
As a robustness test we check RT of proposers in a different setting: the
Yes/No game2 (see Gehrig et al. forthcoming). We do not find any significant
correlation between offers and RT.
1See also the comment by Camerer (2003) in the same issue of Science.
2The Y/N game is a variation of the UG were responders are asked to accept or reject the
proposal before knowing the size of the offer. Obviously all responders accept.
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All in all, following Rubinstein (forthcoming), this paper shows that RT is
an important variable that deserves much more attention.
2 Experimental design3
The analysis presented in this paper is based on data from an experimental
study not designed to explore time responses. The time was just registered
as a control variable. Therefore, we avoid any kind of “demand effect”. The
whole study comprised two different experimental games: the Ultimatum and
the Yes/No game. We used a between-subject’s design, hence, it is possible to
analyze the results from each game independently. The main features of these
sessions are presented below.
280 undergraduate students were recruited (from different disciplines) at
Jena University, using ORSEE 2.0 (Greiner 2004). Nine experimental sessions
were conducted, each using a different group of 32 participants (with the only
exception of one of the Yes/No game’s sessions that involved 24 participants).
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher 2007) at the computer laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Eco-
nomics (Jena, Germany). Table 1 reports the main features of the experiment.
Table 1: E	 Fusc
UG YNG
No of sessions 5 4
No of participants 160 120
Date 06/21/07
Treatment Knowing the co-player’s gender and place of birth
Control variables Own gender, own place of birth, and semester
Method Strategy method4 Standard
Average earnings 8.18C= 8.73C=
Before presenting our main results, it is worth noting that our dependent
variables are: i) actual offers made by proposers in the Ultimatum Game, ii)
responders’ MAO, i.e., exactly the minimum offer that they accepted5 , and iii)
proposals in the Yes/No Game.
3This is just a summary, the complete experimental procedure it is available upon request.
4For responders, the strategy method (Selten 1967) was used. Every responder had to
accept or reject every single offer. The offers were presented in a continuum from the most
generous offer (90 : 10) to the most unfair (10 : 90). The distribution was truncated to avoid
the multiplicity of equilibria. Using this method, we can obtain the “minimum acceptable
offer” (MAO), that is, the minimum amount of ECUs (experimental currency units) that the
responder was willing to accept.
5Fortunately, no responder made a non-monotonic sequence of decisions and we can define
one unique threshold for every second-mover.
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3 Results
Table 1 below shows the analysis of RT. We use censored regression (Tobit) for
the proposers’ offer and the responders’ MAO.
None of the sociodemographic variables are significant, with the only excep-
tion of gender for the proposers. Also the treatment variable is not significant.
The RT is not significant proposers in the Ultimatum game. However, we
find a positive correlation between the minimum acceptable offer and the RT of
the responders.
We find identical results for the Yes/No game: proposers’ behavior is not
related to RT. Since all responders accepted any offer we cannot explore differ-
ences among them.
Table 2: E	
Proposers UG MAO Proposers Y/N
[Tobit] [Tobit] [Tobit]
Decision time −0 .047 0 .503∗ 0 .211
Gender unknown 4.008 2.349 −2.535
Gender proposer −6.566∗∗ −3.379 −13.810∗∗
Gender responder −0.021 −4.343 −4.326
Experience −0.660 1.354 −1.993
Proposer origin −3.553 −14.006 −20.895
Responder origin 0.922 1.661 −1.232
Constant 47.470∗ −10.204 26.449∗∗
pseudo−R2 0.011 0.043 0.025
n 80 80 60
We use ∗ for α < 1% and ∗∗ for α < 5%.
Only our data for proposers’ decisions are strictly comparable to Rubin-
stein’s, but not for the responders,6 since in our experiment participants have
to accept or reject nine different offers, including the one used by Rubinstein.
In sharp contrast with his findings, we find that proposers’ decisions are uncor-
related to RT whereas responders’ behavior are.
4 Discussion and Extension: Types of subjects
In the following, we provide some conjectures about our main results: the no
correlation between proposers’ decisions and RT, and the positive correlation
between responders’ behavior and RT.
For the P, the most simple explanation could be that they face a
trade—off between “own” payoff and the fair distribution. Obviously the weight
that different subjects give to the latter can be different.
6 In Rubinstein’s study, responder face a particular situation: they have to accept or reject
the 10 : 90 (responder : proposer) offer.
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Our conjecture is that individuals just propose the division they find optimal.
This process seems to be less complex and then, we assume it is uncorrelated to
RT. Figure 1 plots the RT of subjects ranked by their offers (along the horizontal
axis).7
This figure illustrates why we do not find any significant difference in the
regression.
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Figure 1: Types of Proposer and Time Response
This conjecture seems to be supported by the results obtained in the Yes/No
game. Observe that no risk is attached to this game since acceptance/rejection
is given. Table 2 does not show any RT effect for the Yes/No game. Thus, the
only explanation is that subjects divide the pie in the manner they wish.
For the R the decision task involves much more complexity:
i) they are asked to accept or reject. However the task is not identical for
all “types” of subjects: in fact, those endowed with selfish preferences would
accept any positive amount, whereas fair—minded individuals need to evaluate
every single offer.
ii) those fair-minded individuals would also consider the possibility of pun-
ishing unfair offers. The latter possibility makes no sense for any selfish indi-
vidual.
7Proposals of 20:80, 60:40, 70:30 and 90:10 are not included since there are respectively
1, 1, 2 and 1 subjects in each case. In sharp contrast we found that the other proposals are
much more common:
• 30:70 - 14 individuals
• 40:60 - 27 individuals
• 50:50 - 30 individuals
We also included the 10:90 (with only 4 individuals) because this is the theoretical predic-
tion.
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Thus, we expect that fair—minded responders take more time to make their
accept/reject decision.
To explore this conjecture, we first show the complete distribution of MAO’s:
• MAO = 10 (38 subjects).
• MAO = 20 (2 subjects).
• MAO = 30 (23 subject).
• MAO = 40 (15 subjects).
• MAO = 50 (2 subjects).
Figure 2 shows the boxplots for each case. We have only considered the
three larger groups, that is, we have not included the two subjects who state a
MAO = 20 (time = 62 and 70 respectively) and those who state a MAO = 50
(time = 42 and 53 respectively).
Results are clear: those subjects who accepted the minimal offer did not take
too much time in making the decision and also the variance seems to be lower.
On the contrary, fair -minded subjects (who asked for a MAO = 30, 40)
needed much more time to make the (negative) final decision.
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Figure 2: Types of Responders and Time Response
Responders’ behavior is much simpler in the Y/N game. They are not re-
quired to define any threshold about fairness. They are only asked to accept or
reject whatever the offer.
Consequently, responders in the Y/N game take significantly less time than
responders in the UG (ZMann−Whitney = 9.416;p < 0.001). Hence, the defini-
tion of the threshold (by responders) makes a difference.
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